Early Friday morning, the United States carried out a drone strike in Baghdad, killing Iranian Quds Force commander Qasem Soleimani and deputy head of Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis. The move shocked the world and has sparked fears that Iraq is increasingly mired in a proxy war between Iran and the United States.
The Kurdistan Region, which has a rocky relationship with Baghdad, close ties to the US, and is home to armed Kurdish groups which operate in Iran and Turkey, will have to tread carefully as it formulates its stance to the crisis. Kurdish analyst Othman Ali, a professor at Salahaddin University in Erbil, believes the wisest option is for the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) to demand the international community and the United Nations play a key role.
The interview, conducted on January 4, 2020, has been edited for length and clarity
What do you think is going to happen in Iraq after the killing of Qasem Soleimani and Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis?
There are observers and political analysts who have several scenarios. But the most important thing, which is clear to everybody, is that neither the United States nor Iran wants a direct confrontation, especially military confrontation. Iran has no military capacity to do so. President Trump has some internal problem of impeachment and at the same time there is an election approaching. So, none of them are really interested in, what you call it, direct confrontation or a war.
President Trump was on record saying that ‘We made a mistake when we invaded Iraq. We should not be there.’ So President Trump’s policy of containment of Iran is based on the idea that Iran has proxies – ‘We should try to hit Iran through its proxies because Iran is also confronting us through its proxies in Iraq like the Hashd al-Shaabi and also in Syria and Lebanon such as Hezbollah.’
So Iran is trying to politically confront US presence in Iraq in the parliament. So, Trump’s policy is containment of Iran through hitting and confronting politically and militarily its proxies in the Middle East, not direct confrontation.
What do you think the implications are for stability in Iraq and the Kurdistan Region?
First of all, there is a scenario that should the Iraqi parliament fail to issue a law to expel American forces, which are around 6,000 and some say even 10,000, then the pro-Iranian Shiite militia have threatened to attack militarily. This will be a very serious confrontation. The Hashd will try to do something similar to what the Houthi group did in Sanaa by taking over Baghdad.
In that case, it will be a serious war because Americans really do not have enough forces to fight. So, in that case, what Americans will do probably will depend [on] Sunni Arab militia, Sunni Arab tribes, and [the] Kurdistan Region. Whether the Kurdish leadership wishes or not, America has military and political presence in Kurdistan. So Kurdistan Region will be imported into that conflict.
In that case, the Kurdish advantages is, like 2003, the Kurds may have an opportunity to use this opportunity to extend or bring back the Kurdistan Region’s disputed areas. Another opportunity is to implement Article 140, taking Shingal and most of Kirkuk. An opportunity will be presented to Kurds because Hashd will be too busy or they will be demoralized or may go to Baghdad. So, Kurds will have that opportunity.
But there is a probability that Kurdistan will be seriously hit by Iranians because Iranian revolutionary commanders, in the last two years, have said, ‘If we are attacked from any place, we will attack the Americans in that place and will attack those regions.’ They meant Saudi Arabia, Israel and Kuwait. So, Kurdistan will also be a target. Kurdish leadership should ask for a kind of shield, like the one Israel has, Patriotic missiles shield. So Kurdistan Region needs that.
Who can provide that?
Americans and Europeans can provide that.
Why would they do that?
Because they are using Kurdistan.
They want to provide a shield to protect their bases?
To protect their bases and protect Kurdistan Region, which is small. Kurdistan needs it in order to avoid such a possibility. However, in my understanding, another issue for Kurds is in the [Iraqi] parliament. Kurdish MPs should not approve the law [to expel US forces from Iraq] that the Shiite groups are proposing on Sunday. They should oppose it very clearly.
Their vote should be justified in this way: first of all, we need the Americans because the Daesh [ISIS] war is not finished. Secondly, the government in Iraq, the obligation of a treaty, should be done by a government, not parliament. We have a caretaker government. So, it has no authority to do this.
Also, in Iraq, we have a situation where regional and internal security is under threat due to the circumstances. Usually, the best way to contain this situation is the presence of external forces and the United Nations. The best solution for Kurds is to use this opportunity to ask for Iraq to be put back again under Chapter 7 of the [United Nations] Security Council.
Most probably Sunni Arab blocs, at least most of them, will sympathize with the Kurdish view that America should stay because the Shiite group is emboldened and strengthened by the support of the Iranian government.
It is in the interests of the Kurds to ask for the internationalization of the Iraqi issue.
You are describing very turbulent times to come in the coming months. What do you think the implications would be for the war against the Islamic State in disputed territories such as Diyala, Makhmour and other places?
I personally think ISIS is no longer a threat. Now, the Americans will be faced and hit strongly in Baghdad and in many places. But for Kurds, ISIS is no longer a threat. If there is a military confrontation between American forces and Shiite militia in Iraq, the Kurds will have a good opportunity. ISIS does not have the military power and presence to threaten Kurdish areas in the disputed areas. Kurds could easily overcome this region and take over.